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Note
DNA PROFILES, COMPUTER SEARCHES, AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
CATHERINE W. KIMEL†
ABSTRACT
Pursuant to federal statutes and to laws in all fifty states, the United
States government has assembled a database containing the DNA
profiles of over eleven million citizens. Without judicial authorization,
the government searches each of these profiles one-hundred thousand
times every day, seeking to link database subjects to crimes they are
not suspected of committing. Yet, courts and scholars that have
addressed DNA databasing have focused their attention almost
exclusively on the constitutionality of the government’s seizure of the
biological samples from which the profiles are generated. This Note
fills a gap in the scholarship by examining the Fourth Amendment
problems that arise when the government searches its vast DNA
database. This Note argues that each attempt to match two DNA
profiles constitutes a Fourth Amendment search because each
attempted match infringes upon database subjects’ expectations of
privacy in their biological relationships and physical movements. The
Note further argues that database searches are unreasonable as they
are currently conducted, and it suggests an adaptation of computersearch procedures to remedy the constitutional deficiency.

INTRODUCTION
Having paid your debt to society, you are finally walking out the
jailhouse door. And as you shake the prison dust off your feet, you
resolve—successfully, as it turns out—never to commit another crime.
No more frightening inmates. No more warden’s ever-watchful eyes.
You are free again, now and for the rest of your life.

Copyright © 2013 by Catherine W. Kimel.
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Chapel Hill, B.A. in English Literature and Political Science, 2008. Thanks to my father, for his
inspiration and example. Thanks also to the staff and editors on the Duke Law Journal, for their
help, their work, and their friendship.
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Or are you? Under the federal system and in every state, the
government creates databases to store the DNA of every person
1
convicted of a prescribed subset of offenses. Law enforcement offices
then search these databases one hundred thousand times a day,
seeking, in the absence of any individualized suspicion, to bring
unsolved crime after unsolved crime down upon database subjects’
2
heads.
This Note addresses the Fourth Amendment issues implicit in
database searches of genetic profiles that are created after and
because subjects were convicted of a statutorily designated crime.
DNA-collection statutes have received a great deal of scholarly
attention, but existing scholarship has focused almost exclusively on
3
the initial extraction of DNA samples. Moreover, scholars have
assumed that if a sample’s extraction is constitutional, then
subsequent searches of its corresponding genetic profile must be
4
constitutional as well.
This Note is the first work squarely to question that assumption.
It argues that comparisons of genetic profiles are Fourth Amendment
searches because they reveal new information about subjects’
biological relationships and their physical presence. Therefore, courts
should require police to obtain a warrant before they compare two
genetic profiles, just as police must obtain a warrant before searching

1. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 84648 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
2. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1391 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search
Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do, 34 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 165, 17881 (2006) (arguing that the “Louisiana and Virginia laws that authorize the
taking of DNA samples from certain arrestees” are unconstitutional).
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment
and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 875 (2006) (“[O]nce the police lawfully collect
DNA for one investigation, the Fourth Amendment permits reanalysis of that sample for a
wholly separate investigation.”); David H. Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a
Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41, 4445 (2011), http://www.
virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2011/08/04/kaye.pdf (defending the First Circuit’s holding that the
government is constitutionally permitted to “retrawl” the DNA profiles in its database “ad
infinitum”); D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality,
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 424 (“[T]here is
no ‘search’ when a lawfully acquired profile is entered in the database or is compared to the
profiles from unsolved crimes.”); Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 83031 (2010) (claiming that database searches do not
warrant the same “tenor of concern” as “physical confrontations, or even informational
inquiries” and that a suspicion-based model is an ill-adapted means of regulating DNA-database
searches).
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a government-owned copy of a suspect’s computer for evidence of a
separate crime. This Note argues that procedures for searches of
computers provide more than a ready model for DNA-database
searches—rather, the DNA-database context actually justifies
computer-search procedures better than computer searches do, and
computer-search procedures would protect genetic privacy more
effectively than they protect electronic privacy.
Part I introduces DNA, DNA databases, and the evolution of
DNA-collection statutes. Part II provides a brief overview of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Part III draws upon that doctrine to argue that
DNA-database searches are Fourth Amendment searches because
the government violates weighty privacy expectations when it
compares two genetic profiles. Finally, Part IV argues that the
constitutional requirements of computer-search procedures highlight
deficiencies in current DNA-database search procedures, and it
questions whether society truly believes that electronic privacy is
more important than genetic privacy—and thus whether current
policies accurately reflect the country’s social values.
I. BACKGROUND: DNA, CODIS, AND COLLECTION STATUTES
To understand the constitutional significance of DNA-database
searching, it is important first to understand exactly what information
is being searched in the databases and how this information comes
into the government’s possession. This Part will briefly explore DNA
as genetic material and as evidence and then will explain the history
and process of DNA-database construction.
A. DNA and DNA Profiling
5

Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is present in most human cells.
DNA contains a sequence of genetic code that is three billion
6
nucleotide base pairs long; each sequence contains instructions for
the production of the proteins essential to “the structure, function,
7
and regulation” of every part of an individual’s tissue and organs.
Thus, DNA constitutes predictive evidence of multitudinous aspects
5. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 309, 314 (2010).
6. International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME
RESEARCH INST. (Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.genome.gov/11006929.
7. What Are Proteins and What Do They Do?, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED. (Nov. 5,
2012), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/howgeneswork/protein.
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of an individual’s mind and body, including the presence or future
8
development of over four thousand heritable diseases. Indeed,
scientists now have decoded all three billion of the human genome’s
9
nucleotide base pairs and have determined that “[m]any, if not most,
10
diseases have their roots in our genes.”
The task of DNA profiling is to whittle this overwhelming
quantity of genetic information down into one easily comparable
profile. Profiling is possible because, although the vast majority of
DNA is identical throughout humankind regardless of biological
relationship, DNA does contain a relatively tiny number of
variations, or polymorphisms, that render each individual’s genetic
11
material unique. DNA profiling exploits these polymorphisms by
creating a numeric record of the subject’s genome at thirteen
specified sites known to exhibit strong polymorphic tendencies and
thought to be noncoding, meaning that those sites are unable to
12
predict disease states or predispositions. As a result, genetic profiles
13
are easily differentiated. The DNA-search process compares one
numerically expressed DNA profile to another and assesses the
14
similarities between the two.
Although the chances are
infinitesimally small that two people who are not identical twins will
15
exhibit the same polymorphisms at all thirteen loci, the presence of
some common variations indicates a biological relationship between
two profiles’ subjects. The more commonalities, the closer the likely
16
biological connection. A person can seek to match two profiles at all
thirteen genetic markers—suggesting common identity between the

8. Gene Mutations and Disease, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www.cancer.
gov/cancertopics/understandingcancer/genetesting/page8.
9. International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, supra note 6.
10. Gene Mutations and Disease, supra note 8.
11. Suter, supra note 5, at 314.
12. Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 6566 (1st Cir. 2010).
13. See Bruce S. Weir, The Rarity of DNA Profiles, 1 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 358, 369
(2007) (“[T]he probability that a randomly chosen person has a particular forensic profile can
-10
easily reach the small value of 10 .”).
14. Suter, supra note 5, at 31920.
15. See Matthew Gilbert, Police Seeing Double in Rape Case Involving Identical Twins,
CNN (June 7, 2004), http://articles.cnn.com/2004-06-07/justice/twins_1_identical-twins-dnasample-dna-testing?_s=PM:LAW (recounting a Michigan rape investigation in which DNA was
the only evidence and the DNA recovered from the scene was a complete match for two
identical twins, both of whom had prior convictions for sex offenses).
16. Suter, supra note 5, at 31819.
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profiles’ subjects—or one can seek to match profiles at only some of
17
the genetic markers—suggesting the subjects’ close kinship.
Because DNA profiling and matching involve only thirteen
purportedly noncoding loci, proponents have touted the process’s
18
respect for genetic privacy. Even if the thirteen genomic markers
from which genetic profiles are generated do not indicate health
conditions, the information contained within a genetic profile still is
19
20
sufficient to establish paternity and kinship ties, and to predict the
21
22
subject’s race, sex, and even surname. It also is important to
remember that our understanding of the human genome is
incomplete. Scientists continually discover medical value in genetic
23
components once thought to be meaningless, and it remains entirely
possible that scientists one day will find that genetic profiles’
composite loci code for important health determinants. Some
24
evidence indicates that such a discovery is not unrealistic.
B. DNA Databasing
The state’s process for matching two DNA profiles begins with
the creation of the profiles themselves, which the state then stores in
searchable databases. The first step in the generation of this profile is
to extract a biological sample from the subject, usually in the form of

17. Id. at 325–27. Some law enforcement offices have begun to search for “partial
matches,” or matches at less than all thirteen loci, which implicate the relatives of the matching
profile’s subject. Id. at 324. This practice of “familial searching” remains controversial and is not
yet widespread in the United States. Id. at 32527.
18. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (stating that the thirteen loci “were
purposely selected because they are not associated with any known physical or medical
characteristics”).
19. Joh, supra note 4, at 169.
20. Suter, supra note 5, at 31819.
21. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
22. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1331.
23. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Study Discovers Road Map of DNA; A Key to Biology, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A1 (reporting on new studies showing that genetic material previously
thought to be “junk” DNA in fact controls how genes function and contributes to the
development of diseases like multiple sclerosis and lupus).
24. Suter, supra note 5, at 332 & n.155. This early evidence is, of course, contested. See
David H. Kaye, Commentary, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 179, 188 (2001) (“Contrary to the assertion in [Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra
Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data
Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127 (2001)], all [profile-composite loci] are noncoding, and none is
known to correlate with any observable traits—stigmatizing or otherwise.”).
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25

blood or saliva. The government then sends that sample to a state
forensic laboratory, where state employees construct a genetic profile
26
from the sample. No federal statute governs the sample’s disposition
after the profile is created, and states—with the sole exception of
27
Wisconsin—retain the tissue samples indefinitely.
Once created, the genetic profile is uploaded into the Combined
28
DNA Index System (CODIS), a national database overseen by the
29
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and subdivided into local,
30
state, and national levels. The uploaded information includes the
profile itself, a specimen identifier, and identification of the
31
laboratory and technician who generated the profile. Profiles enter
CODIS at the local level and subsequently become accessible at the
32
state and national levels. As of September 2012, the national CODIS
database contained more than 11,628,300 profiles, 11,176,400 of which
were derived from voluntary donors and from categories of convicts,
arrestees, and others whose DNA profiling is authorized or mandated
33
by statute. When police conduct a CODIS search, they compare a

25. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 81617. Generally, the sample is taken while the subject is
incarcerated or is otherwise subject to state control. See, e.g., Bureau of Forensic Services,
STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/content/faq.php#dna (last visited Nov.
20, 2012). However, the government can (and has) taken biological samples for DNA profiling
surreptitiously from unincarcerated individuals. Joh, supra note 4, at 86062.
26. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102i (West 2009 & Supp. 2012). The profile-creation
process takes twenty-three to thirty weeks. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice,
False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 73233
(2007).
27. Suter, supra note 5, at 334 & n.172. Only eight state statutes explicitly proscribe testing
for purposes beyond DNA profiling, and many statutes allow sample use for unspecified “law
enforcement purposes.” Id. at 33536.
28. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166.
29. Suter, supra note 5, at 316.
30. Murphy, supra note 26, at 739.
31. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166.
32. Id. At all levels of stratification, CODIS profiles are divided into two categories: the
“Forensic Index,” which contains genetic profiles created from crime-scene samples and
unidentified human remains, and the “Offender Index,” which contains genetic profiles created
from compelled samples and samples that were voluntarily contributed to assist an investigation
(by relatives of missing persons, for example). Suter, supra note 5, at 315–16. For a discussion of
the scope-of-consent issue surrounding the government’s retention of genetic samples and
profiles that were given voluntarily, see Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 42330.
33. CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last updated September 2012).
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profile generated from a crime-scene sample against each of the
34
11,176,400 profiles that constitute the national Offender Index.
C. Evolving Authority for DNA Evidence Collection and Databasing
DNA evidence originally served only to support linkages
between established suspects and specific crimes. Prosecutors first
35
used DNA evidence in the late 1980s and early 1990s to shore up
cases against established suspects through proof that DNA evidence
36
found at a crime scene matched the suspect’s genetic profile. During
this period, the state could secure a DNA sample only with a court
order based upon individualized suspicion, with the suspect’s consent,
or by investing the time needed to track the suspect and recover an
37
“abandoned” DNA sample.
Then, in the mid-1990s, Congress and state legislatures began to
enact statutes that compelled submission of DNA samples from
people who were not suspects in any investigation and that prescribed
38
the creation of DNA databases. The early DNA-collection statutes
generally required a person to submit a biological sample upon
39
conviction of a sex offense or a violent felony. Since their enactment,
however, DNA-collection statutes have expanded rapidly in scope.
The statutes first were broadened to include people convicted of any
40
felony.
Later, the statutes grew to encompass convicted
41
misdemeanants. The federal DNA-collection statute now authorizes
the government to extract biological samples from illegal

34. The FBI and DNA: Part 1: A Look at the Nationwide System That Helps Solve Crimes,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/
november/dna_112311.
35. Murphy, supra note 26, at 731.
36. Suter, supra note 5, at 315.
37. John D. Biancamano, Note, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection
Statutes and Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 620 (2009).
38. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166.
39. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1329. As of 2008, all fifty states required DNA samples from
people convicted of sex offenses and certain violent crimes. Kimberly A. Wah, Note, A New
Investigative Lead: Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting Tool, 29 WHITTIER L.
REV. 909, 926 (2008).
40. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1329. As of 2010, forty-nine states collected biological samples
from all convicted felons. Idaho is the only state to resist this trend. DNA Laws Database Topic
Summaries, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/justice/dna-laws-database-topic-summaries.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2012).
41. Murphy, supra note 2, at 132930. As of 2006, thirty-eight or more states required
biological samples from some subsection of misdemeanants. Rick Weiss, Vast DNA Bank Pits
Policing Vs. Privacy, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1.
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42

immigrants. Finally, many states currently require biological samples
43
from some or all arrestees, from those acquitted by reason of
44
45
insanity, and even from juvenile offenders. Meanwhile, CODIS has
experienced a parallel expansion. The database was conceived as a
pilot project among fourteen states in 1990, was formalized by federal
46
47
legislation in 1994, and was used by all fifty states by 1998.
Rather than link identified suspects to specific crimes, the
distinct purpose of DNA-collection statutes has been to facilitate the
creation of genetic databases to assist law enforcement in generating
48
suspects for unspecified past and future crimes. So far, CODIS has
resulted in “numerous” people being “convicted on the basis of a cold

42. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
43. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1330. Because arrest rates are particularly high among young
people, arrestee-collection statutes place many Americans under DNA surveillance for
practically the entirety of their adult lives. See Erica Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age
23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at A16 (“By age 23, almost a third of Americans
have been arrested for a crime . . . .”). Nearly half the states have enacted arrestee-collection
statutes. DNA Collection upon Arrest, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR SCI., TECH. & THE LAW AT
STETSON UNIV. COLL. OF LAW (May 2011), http://www.ncstl.org/resources/DNACollection
UponArrest. The federal courts so far have split on whether these statutes are constitutional.
Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 47576 (2010).
Most recently, a California state appellate court struck down the portion of California’s DNAcollection law that required all felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample. People v. Buza, 129
Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Ct. App. 2011).
44. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.2(3) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.20(g) (West
2009 & Supp. 2012). It is illustrative of the speed of collection statutes’ expansion that Professor
Erin Murphy was able to speculate as recently as 2008 that “[a]lthough no such statutes exist, it
is not difficult to imagine the passage of legislation requiring the collection of DNA samples
from mentally ill persons or other such individuals—not on the basis of being arrested or
convicted of a crime, but rather as a result of simply being labeled ‘dangerous.’” Murphy, supra
note 2, at 1330.
45. Suter, supra note 5, at 317. As of 2006, thirty-one United States jurisdictions required
DNA samples from some juvenile offenders. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DNA
FORENSICS: EXPANDING USES AND INFORMATION SHARING 2 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=774.
46. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166; see also DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, tit. XXI, subtit. C, 108 Stat. 2065, 2069 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006))
(“The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish an index of . . . DNA
identification records of persons convicted of crimes . . . .”).
47. Maclin, supra note 3, at 166.
48. See, e.g., id. at 167 (“[A] spokeswoman of Virginia Delegate Ryan McDougle, who
sponsored [the bill] to expand the state’s DNA database to cover arrestees, confirmed that the
legislative intent behind the bill was to match the DNA of violent felony arrestees to DNA
evidence from unsolved crimes and not to merely obtain the identity of those arrested by the
state.”).
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49

hit alone.” As of January 16, 2009, law enforcement offices across
the country benefited from over 79,000 cold hits that matched DNA
profiles created from crime-scene samples to the profiles of CODIS
50
subjects who had not been suspects in the investigations, and the
incidence of cold-hit matches continues to rise exponentially as
51
CODIS acquires more and more DNA profiles.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF BASIC FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
52
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.” The amendment was a
resounding rejection of colonial America’s experience with general
warrants and writs of assistance, which had “permitted the King’s
officials to enter private homes and conduct dragnet searches for
53
evidence of any crime.”
In keeping with the Fourth Amendment’s purpose of protecting
personal privacy, “some quantum of individualized suspicion is
54
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.” Indeed,

49. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV.
291, 296 (2010).
50. Laboratory Services: Table 1: Statistics of Cold Hits and Success Rates Based on NDIS
Data from CODIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/oct2009/undermicroscope/table1.htm.
51. Murphy, supra note 26, at 740.
52. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); see also United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (finding that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect against “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals”); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)
(“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”). The Fourth
Amendment itself reads,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536
(2005). See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 5178 (1937) (describing the role that
writs of assistance played in precipitating the American Revolution).
54. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 667 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“For most of our constitutional history, mass,
suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable . . . .”).
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the basic Fourth Amendment test for a “reasonable” search is the
prior issuance of a judicial warrant based upon the state’s proof of
55
probable cause to believe that the specific individual to be searched
is or has been engaged in a specific criminal activity, specific evidence
of which is likely to be found at the specific location listed in the
56
warrant. Warrants are the standard measure of reasonableness
because the specificity that warrants require “ensures that the search
will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers
57
intended to prohibit.”
However, the warrant and probable-cause requirements
underlying the reasonableness standard do not account for all
searches sanctioned by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court
58
has carved out numerous exceptions to those requirements, finely
granulating when searches are reasonable without a warrant or
59
probable cause in some fact patterns, and at other times leaving

55. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (“Probable cause exists when ‘there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))).
56. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (noting that a seizure is “per se
unreasonable . . . unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable
cause”).
57. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
58. For example, special-needs searches are an exception to the warrant and
individualized-suspicion requirements. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455
(1990). In other circumstances, no warrant is required, but there must be probable cause. See
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (“Dispensing with the need for a warrant is worlds
apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would require,
i. e., the standard of probable cause.”). In still other situations, individualized suspicion is
required, but at a lower level than probable cause, and the warrant requirement is dispensed
with. See Place, 462 U.S. at 697–79 (holding that an officer’s seizure of personal luggage on the
basis of reasonable suspicion but without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that an officer behaved constitutionally when he
patted someone down on the basis of reasonable suspicion but with no warrant). Finally,
sometimes the warrant requirement persists, but individualized suspicion is deemed
unnecessary. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (holding that municipal health
inspectors constitutionally could conduct a suspicionless administrative search of an apartment,
but that the tenant had the right to refuse them entry until they obtained a warrant).
59. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555–60 (1979) (holding that both prison-cell
searches and visual body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees are reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 55556 (stating that a vehicle search by roving
border patrols “need not be justified by probable cause and may be undertaken if the stopping
officer is ‘aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,
that reasonably warrant suspicion’ that a vehicle contains illegal aliens” but prohibiting searches
based simply on the vehicle’s “general vicinity” to the border (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975))); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)

KIMEL IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

12/20/2012 12:14 PM

2013] DNA PROFILES & THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

943

60

outcomes dependent upon an amorphous balancing test. Still, this
much has been established: a “search” occurs, and some measure of
Fourth Amendment protection is triggered, when “the government
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
61
reasonable.” Once a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, the
only question is what degree of protection the Fourth Amendment
62
will afford.
III. ARE CODIS SEARCHES FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES?
Naturally, then, the first question to arise in this Note’s inquiry
into constitutionality of CODIS searches is whether such searches are
in fact “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. To
determine whether CODIS searches are independent Fourth
Amendment searches, it is necessary to ask, first, whether those
subject to the searches have a “subjective expectation of privacy” in
the DNA profiles that the government lawfully has created and,
second, whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation of
63
privacy as “reasonable.” This Part will address each question in turn,
ultimately arguing that subjects’ continuing privacy interest in their
genetic profiles is both actual and reasonable, and thus that the
Fourth Amendment is implicated in every CODIS search.
A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy
CODIS searches meet the first prong of the Fourth Amendment
test because CODIS subjects’ actual expectation of privacy in their
biological relationships and physical whereabouts persists even after
the government has seized their DNA. First, the large volume and
personal nature of the information in DNA gives rise to privacy
expectations that are broader and more durable than the expectations
surrounding other types of physical evidence. Second, CODIS

(holding that a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment).
60. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1978) (“The reasonableness of seizures that
are less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and
the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’”
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977))).
61. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
62. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (rejecting “the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not
come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something
called a ‘technical arrest’ or a ‘full-blown search’”).
63. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
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subjects have discrete privacy expectations in their genetic
relationship with each person to whom their profile is compared and
in their physical presence in each place where a forensic sample is
found. Third and finally, under current jurisprudence, the
government’s continuous CODIS searches undermine CODIS
subjects’ subjective privacy interests in a profound and fundamental
way.
Proponents of DNA-collection statutes contend that any
invasion of subjects’ privacy is complete upon the initial tissue
extraction and the generation of the genetic profile, and that
subsequent profile searches reexamine previously acquired
information but reveal no “new, private or intimate information” and
64
therefore create no new Fourth Amendment issue. Because a
“defendant could not possibly assert any expectation of privacy with
respect to the scientific analysis of a lawfully seized item of tangible
property, such as a gun,” proponents argue, DNA likewise
legitimately is “subject to a battery of scientific tests” once it is
65
lawfully in the government’s possession.
This argument, however, overlooks the extreme qualitative
difference between DNA and an “item of tangible property, such as a
gun.” Unlike an item of tangible property, DNA contains inherently
personal information about an individual. Whereas a scientific
analysis of a gun reveals only the properties of an inanimate and not
particularly personal object, the significance of which is limited to the
investigation at hand, the administration of “a battery of scientific
tests” upon a person’s DNA has the capacity to reveal the unique
manner in which that person constitutes and regulates every aspect of
66
her being. The strict confidentiality attending the results of private
genetic testing illuminates this intuitive understanding of privacy
expectations in genetic information and contrasts strongly with
64. Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 2010); see also State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131,
14142 (Haw. 2003) (“[The defendant’s] privacy interest in his blood and hair terminated at the
time the sample was obtained pursuant to a lawful search and seizure.”); People v. King, 663
N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div. 1997) (“Privacy concerns are no longer relevant once the sample
has already lawfully been removed from the body . . . .”); Kaye, supra note 4, at 45 (“Once the
government lawfully acquires the [genetic] information, the marginal invasion of privacy that
comes from using it later is minimal.”). Even commentators who challenge the constitutionality
of DNA-collection statutes tend to focus their attack on the initial extraction of genetic
information rather than on subsequent database searches, or they simply assume that later
database searches do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Joh, supra note 4, at 875.
65. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
66. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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expectations regarding the results of a scientific manipulation of an
67
ordinary item of property. Finally, the prospect of the state’s
“battery” of tests is all the more threatening when one considers that
the only limit that many DNA-collection statutes impose upon the
state’s use of biological samples is the vague restriction that the
68
samples be used in fulfillment of “law enforcement purposes.”
Moreover, each attempt to match two genetic profiles does in
fact reveal novel private information, in at least two ways. First,
genetic matching uncovers what biological relationship exists between
69
the persons whom the profiles identify. Although one’s genetic
profile may be forever established in the initial profiling, genetic
relationships are newly explored with each potential match, whether
the government seeks a complete match or the more controversial
70
partial match. Therefore, because each profile comparison reveals
new, otherwise-private information about the biological relationship
between the profiles’ subjects, subjective privacy expectations arise
anew with each genetic comparison.
Importantly, these privacy expectations assert themselves
regardless of the expected outcome of the genetic comparisons; it is

67. For example, it is the position of the World Health Organization that “[i]f anything, the
confidentiality of genetic information may need to be guarded even more stringently
than . . . ordinary [medical information].” Genetic Testing, GENOMIC RES. CTR., WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/genomics/elsi/gentesting/en (last visited Nov. 20, 2012); see
also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (holding that a hospital program that
informed police of pregnant patients who tested positive for cocaine use violated the Fourth
Amendment, and viewing as important that “[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by
the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will
not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent”).
68. Suter, supra note 5, at 33536. For example, in writing about familial database searches,
Professor Murphy worries that the disproportionately African-American and Hispanic CODIS
population risks “open[ing] the door to a kind of twenty-first century racial eugenics in which
crime and criminology are viewed largely as functions of genetics and biology.” Murphy, supra
note 49, at 32125.
69. The concept that comparison can work a Fourth Amendment harm, even when one of
the objects being compared is lawfully in the government’s possession, is not new to the federal
courts. See United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that a
Fourth Amendment search occurred when police inserted a key, lawfully in the state’s
possession, into a lock, without opening the door, in order to determine ownership of the key);
United States v. Portillo-Reyes, 529 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1975) (same). But see United States
v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that no Fourth Amendment search occurred
under a similar fact pattern); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 1984)
(same); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987) (holding that an officer’s copying down of a
stereo’s serial number to compare to a stolen stereo’s serial number was not a Fourth
Amendment search).
70. See supra text accompanying note 17.

KIMEL IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

946

12/20/2012 12:14 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:933

not the case that people with “nothing to hide” are unalarmed by
71
comparisons of their genetic material with someone else’s. Indeed, if
people were concerned for their genetic privacy only when they
believed that their genetic information was in some way inculpatory,
then a man would not mind undergoing paternity testing not just for
his (purported) children, but for the whole neighborhood. Similarly, a
woman would not mind undergoing genetic screening not just with
her spouse, but with all the men in town. The reality is that although
genetic information is in itself intensely personal, comparisons
between a person’s own genetic makeup and someone else’s acquire
an additional layer of intimacy. In the same way that one’s privacy is
not less invaded because the paternity tests disclose that one is not a
neighbor’s parent, it is immaterial to the Fourth Amendment that
CODIS searches most often reveal that two profiles are “not a
72
match.” The Fourth Amendment “does not protect information per
se,” but instead “protects individuals against oppressive methods for
73
acquiring that information.” It matters not that the majority of
CODIS searches do not return a hit because the method of searching
subjects’ genetic profiles within a database for a match is “arbitrary
74
and oppressive.”

71. This Note’s argument is thus distinct from the straw man that proponents of DNAcollection statutes argue against, namely, that the Fourth Amendment should protect criminals’
privacy interest in not being identified as the perpetrator of their crimes. See, e.g., Kaye, supra
note 4, at 4647 (“[S]urely retrawls could reveal things a person would rather keep private. For
example, an individual whose DNA profile is in the database . . . might well be concerned that
later trawls will expose him as the perpetrator of an unsolved crime.”). Justice Scalia offered a
more ingenious articulation of the interplay between privacy and criminality, writing for the
majority in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987): “there is nothing new in the realization that
the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of
us all,” id. at 329.
72. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998) (“[A] Fourth
Amendment violation is ‘fully accomplished’ by the illegal search . . . .” (quoting United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1987))); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 (finding in the context of a search that
consisted of moving a turntable a couple of inches that “[i]t matters not that the search
uncovered nothing of any great personal value to respondent—serial numbers rather than (what
might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs,”
because “[a] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable”); cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home . . . all details are
intimate details . . . .”).
73. Kaye, supra note 4, at 47.
74. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (“The Fourth
Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of
individuals.”).
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The second way in which CODIS searches expose information
that would otherwise remain private is by divulging subjects’ presence
in noncriminal but embarrassing places. Wherever we go, we leave a
75
trail of DNA behind us in the form of skin, saliva, hair, or blood.
Because modern DNA analysis requires only a tiny volume of tissue
to generate a genetic profile, one leaves more than enough DNA
behind to betray her presence in a space when she discards a spent
76
cigarette or leaves her cup on the table after dining in a restaurant.
When the person shedding the DNA is a CODIS subject, then, the
government can deduce her movements by collecting, profiling, and
matching the DNA she continually leaves in her wake. The danger
here is that CODIS subjects who were present in a place where a
crime was committed—but at a time other than during its
commission—would have their private movements exposed to
scrutiny despite the lack of any independent connection between the
CODIS subject and the crime.
Again, CODIS searches offend subjective expectations of
privacy even in the absence of crime. After all, concern for privacy in
one’s physical movements is “not . . . solely the lot of the guilty. To be
law abiding is not necessarily to be spotless,” and “[u]nwanted
attention from the local police need not be less discomforting simply
77
because one’s secrets are not the stuff of criminal prosecutions.” The
government’s practice of comparing all profiles within CODIS with
every crime-scene sample that they generate has the capacity to
reveal such intimate, noncriminal information as a CODIS subject’s
extramarital affair, the identity of her sexual partners, or her presence
in a sex shop, strip club, or any number of other places rendered
embarrassing by individual circumstance. CODIS searches’ capacity
to reveal personal, noncriminal activity in addition to criminal activity
distinguishes the database searches from police practices that do not
rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment search, such as canine sniffs
that reveal only hidden contraband or blood tests that reveal only the
78
presence of drugs in the suspect’s system.

75. Joh, supra note 4, at 858.
76. Jaxon Van Derbeken, How Alleged Serial Killer Fell into Trap, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21,
2003, at A1. A DNA profile can be constructed from a microscopic six-cell biological sample.
Murphy, supra note 26, at 733.
77. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
78. Compare Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 40910 (2005) (stating that one of the
critical factors rendering police use of a heat-sensing device unconstitutional in Kyllo v. United
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Further, subjective privacy expectations are not extinguished by
the subject’s awareness that the government possesses his genetic
profile. As a formal matter, courts repeatedly have held that one need
not exclude others absolutely in order to maintain an expectation of
79
privacy over a place or thing. Given this framework, it makes sense
to relax the exclusion requirement in the context of DNA because
DNA is by its nature nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, yet highly
80
personal. In addition, practically speaking, if a person knows of no
reason why she should be suspected of wrongdoing, she also expects
that intimate aspects of her life—including her DNA—are free from
state scrutiny. Therefore, just because a person knows that the police
generated her DNA profile as a result of a prior conviction does not
mean that that person expects her profile to be searched continually,
for years, for unrelated crimes that she is not suspected of
committing. Indeed, for evidence that individuals maintain an
expectation of genetic privacy in the face of knowledge that police
legitimately possess their DNA profile, one need look no further than
the lawsuits brought by individuals who voluntarily gave DNA
samples to assist with a specific investigation, only to find that the
state retained their samples after the investigation ended and added
81
their profiles to the government’s files.

States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), was that “the device was capable of detecting lawful activity”), with
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (finding that “[a] ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained
narcotics detection dog” is not a Fourth Amendment search in part because “[i]t does not
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view”), and
Porter v. State, 93 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A] government investigative
technique, such as a dog sniff or chemical test, that discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, and does not expose noncontraband items, activity, or information that would
otherwise remain hidden from public view, does not intrude on a legitimate expectation of
privacy and is thus not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”).
79. See, e.g., Sara M. Smyth, Searches of Computers and Computer Data at the United States
Border: The Need for a New Framework Following United States v. Arnold, 2009 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 69, 97 (“The mere act of accessing a network does not, in itself, extinguish
privacy expectations, nor does the fact that others may have occasional access to the
computer.”); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (finding a subjective expectation
of privacy in a closed public telephone booth made of glass).
80. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]e can’t go anywhere or do much of anything without leaving a bread-crumb
trail of identifying DNA matter.”).
81. See, e.g., John R. Ellement, Keeping DNA Samples Limited, Court Rules, BOS. GLOBE
(Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/08/26/keeping_
dna_samples_limited_court_rules (recounting a six-year legal battle to recover a voluntary
subject’s DNA sample and profile).
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Finally, for subjects who are aware of the government’s
continuous use of their genetic profile in CODIS, the government’s
database searches also injure subjective privacy expectations in a
more latent, pervasive sense. The source of this pernicious harm is the
fact that sustained suspicionless searches of DNA databases are “both
visible (in that the subjects know they might be watched) and
unverifiable (in that they do not know when they are being
82
watched).” Database searches are conducted en masse and without
individualized suspicion, and subjects therefore cannot predict in
what context their genetic code, and thereby their movements and
relationships, will come under the government microscope. In this
way, DNA-database searches can intrude upon subjects’ “negative
83
freedom,” or their “freedom of not being interfered with.” The
unpredictability of the searches can rob subjects of their generalized
sense of privacy and compel them in all situations “to plan [their]
actions while taking into account the public that has been forced on
84
[them] and that judges those actions.”
The Supreme Court has recognized that negative freedom is an
important aspect of citizens’ privacy interests. For example, in
85
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found that the preservation of negative
freedom—or, as the Court called it, “transcendent” freedom—is
fundamental to the sustenance of other aspects of liberty because
“[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self” and “spheres of our lives
86
and existence . . . where the State [is not] a dominant presence.”
87
Additionally, in New York v. Ferber, the Court found indeterminate

82. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1385 (emphasis omitted).
83. Id. at 1386 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY 118, 12223 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to be let alone [is] the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”), overruled by Katz, 389
U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
84. Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism—Protection of Human
Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest—The Proper Balance, 37 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 27, 32 (2004). Some evidence suggests that people experience continuous or
unfocused searches as more invasive than targeted searches related to specific investigations.
See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317, 335 (2008) (documenting the results of an empirical study on perceptions of
intrusiveness).
85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
86. Id. at 562; see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment—is basic to a free society.”).
87. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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surveillance of noncriminal acts to be a serious invasion of privacy
88
Specifically, the Ferber Court found that child
interests.
pornography injures the subject child’s “interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters” because the child “must go through
life knowing that the recording [of her sexual act] is circulating,”
89
constantly “fear[ing] . . . exposure.” The child does not fear exposure
as a criminal; the child is not a criminal. Rather, the child fears the
deep humiliation that would attend the revelation of an intimate
aspect of her person in a context that she cannot control—a
personhood concern not wholly divorced from the privacy interest
90
implicated in the content and physical presence of one’s DNA.
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
CODIS searches meet the second prong of the test for a Fourth
Amendment search because CODIS subjects’ persistent expectations
of privacy in their genetic relationships and physical movements are
reasonable. First, society finds its own privacy expectations in these
matters reasonable, and there is no constitutionally permissible
reason to treat CODIS subjects’ expectations any differently. Second,
DNA’s form and content distinguish DNA from evidence that is
guarded by less robust privacy interests and align it instead with
computer evidence, which the Fourth Amendment strongly protects.
Generally, Americans oppose the imposition of a national DNA
91
database with universal coverage. In defending the existing DNA-

88. See id. at 774 (holding that the right to free speech does not forbid states from banning
the sale of material depicting children engaged in sexual activity).
89. Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); David P. Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545
(1981); and Ulrich C. Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 289, 292 (1980)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
90. See id. (“[I]t is the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret that seem
to have the most profound emotional repercussions.” (citation omitted)).
91. Cf., e.g., Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System:
Historical Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 63, 82 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (“Given the widespread popular view
of DNA as ‘genetic blueprint’ and distrust of government, . . . politicians will be reluctant to
support a universal genetic database. Thus, DNA databases can be expected to include
everyone designated ‘criminal’ but not ‘law-abiding’ citizens.”); Peter Neufeld, Panel Discussion
at the Conference on DNA and the Criminal Justice System at Harvard University (Nov. 21,
2000) (transcript available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/dna/transcribe_table_page.htm)
(“[F]rankly . . . most people in the country are not in favor of the universal databank for a
variety of reasons.”). Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612 (Cal. 2011), is
illustrative of Americans’ overweening concern with privacy in their personal-identification
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collection database, the government often finds it necessary to
92
disavow the possibility of a universal database, and police oppose
93
their own inclusion in CODIS. So, intuitively, it also should be true
that society finds its own expectation of genetic privacy “reasonable,”
even its expectation of privacy in DNA profiles constructed from
noncoding loci. Society believes that its privacy expectations are
“reasonable” even though most people presumably do not plan to
embark upon a crime spree.
But even if subjects’ privacy interests are implicated by
continuous database searches, defenders of the CODIS searches’
constitutionality contend, the classes of people to whom DNAcollection statutes apply have a reduced expectation of privacy that
94
database searches do not violate. In other words, because the
majority of those whose genetic profiles inhabit CODIS are present
95
or former criminal convicts, society is not prepared to recognize
their genetic privacy interests as “reasonable,” at least as far as their
DNA profiles are concerned. Yet the Supreme Court has “repeatedly
held” that prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional rights at the
prison door, with the sole exception of rights that are “fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the
96
97
objectives of incarceration.” Thus, in Hudson v. Palmer, the
Supreme Court found that a prisoner does not have a reasonable

information. In that case, a Williams-Sonoma customer brought a winning lawsuit to stop
retailers from querying customers for their zip codes. Id. at 620.
92. See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 143 (Haw. 2003) (“[T]he prosecution contends
that [the defense’s] concern that ‘[l]aw enforcement could gather a DNA databank of its
citizens . . . appears to be an overstatement.’” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting
the defense) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. See Dave Collins, Police Wary of Giving DNA Samples, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 16,
2001, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/police-dna-samples_n_1015541.
html (“Rank-and-file police from Connecticut to Chicago to Los Angeles have opposed what
some experts say is a slowly emerging trend in the U.S. to collect officers’ DNA. ‘From a civil
liberties standpoint, there are a lot of red flags,’ said Connecticut Trooper Steven Rief, former
president of the state police union.”).
94. See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(“[Prisoners’] privacy interests are extinguished by the judgments placing them in custody.”).
95. Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Approach: A Viewpoint on the Study of the Legal,
Ethical and Policy Considerations Raised by DNA Tests and Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
214, 216 (2006).
96. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); see also Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 418
(“The state could hardly provide that a citizen convicted of even the most heinous crime
thereby forfeits the right to free speech, the privilege against self-incrimination, or the plethora
of other rights secured by the Constitution.”).
97. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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expectation of privacy in his prison cell because such an expectation
“simply cannot be reconciled with . . . the needs and objectives of
98
penal institutions,” including the need to protect inmates, staff, and
99
visitors from weapons that an inmate could conceal there.
100
Griffin v. Wisconsin is perhaps even more relevant to the issue
of searching subjects’ genetic profiles within a database because it
involves the reasonable privacy expectations of individuals who have
101
been convicted of a crime but who are not physically incarcerated.
In Griffin, a warrantless “special needs” search of a probationer’s
home was found constitutional, even though the search was justified
102
by less than probable cause. In deeming the search “reasonable”
despite the lowered level of individualized suspicion, the Court held
that probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy because their
continued physical liberty depends upon their supervised compliance
103
with conditions not applicable to generalized society.
This
heightened supervision is in turn justified because “‘the very
assumption of the institution of probation’ is that the probationer ‘is
104
more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.’” Because
police must confirm probationers’ adherence to probation restrictions
even within the probationers’ own homes, probationers enjoy only a
105
reduced expectation of privacy inside their homes.
In Hudson and Griffin, the Court recognized that convicts’
reasonable expectations of privacy are reduced to the extent
necessary for the imposition of the prescribed punishment as a
practical matter. Yet neither Hudson nor Griffin held that convicts
lose reasonable privacy expectations simply by virtue of being
convicts. Indeed, the Court in Hudson was explicit that citizens do not
106
lose their constitutional rights upon conviction of a crime.
98. Id. at 526.
99. Id. at 52627.
100. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
101. Id. at 87072.
102. Id. at 872.
103. Id. at 87475; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (“Inherent in
the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled.’” (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874)); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (“Parole is a ‘variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.’”
(quoting Morrissey v. Breyer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972))).
104. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880).
105. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (defining and discussing the goals of probation).
106. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (“[W]e have insisted that prisoners be
accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment.”); see also Wolff v.
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Under Hudson and Griffin, it is unclear from whence might stem
the reduced privacy expectations of convicts subject to DNAcollection statutes. Unlike the searches at issue in those cases,
searching the DNA profiles in CODIS cannot be necessary to enforce
the punishments meted out to these convicts, as searching for
evidence of a second crime clearly is unrelated to imposition of
punishment for the crime for which the individual already has been
107
convicted. Furthermore, in stark contrast to probationers, once a
DNA-database subject has paid her debt to society for a crime for
which she has been convicted, the justice system positively is
forbidden to “assum[e]” that she is “more likely than the ordinary
108
citizen to violate the law.” Rather, if the former convict is ever again
suspected of criminal activity, she will enjoy the benefit of “the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary,” which “lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law,” that “there is a
109
presumption of innocence” in her favor. Finally, added to these
essential problems is a temporal one. Prisoners complete their jail
terms and probation periods end, and those individuals will regain
normal privacy expectations—but the government retains and
110
searches DNA profiles into perpetuity.
Ultimately, one might concede that CODIS subjects have a
continuing reasonable expectation of privacy in their DNA profiles
but nevertheless argue that society simply would feel better knowing
that former convicts were forever subject to genetic surveillance.
However, this wish cannot overcome the Fourth Amendment’s

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 55556 (1974) (“There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country.”).
107. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 8182 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Clearly, the cases in which the
Supreme Court has concluded that prisoners forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights upon
incarceration deal with searches . . . for reasons of safety and orderly administration of prison
facilities, concerns not implicated [by DNA-collection statutes].”).
108. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
109. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
110. See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a felon who
has completed probation does not have a right to purge his DNA sample even though he has
completed his sentence). Thus, CODIS searches persist for longer than the law justifies other,
more formalized methods of supervision. Cf. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1375 (“[T]he right story
to tell about technological surveillance and control is not one of streamlining or one-for-one
substitution, but rather one of proliferation, expansion, and enhancement. . . . [F]ocused on the
strictures that govern what appears to be a more restrictive physical alternative, courts neglect
to ask whether the more restrictive option would apply or, even if it did, whether any distinct
burdens of the technological restraint demand some special procedural due process.”).
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protection of CODIS subjects any more than hospital administrators’
desire to foster newborn health can supersede the Fourth
111
Amendment’s protection of new mothers who use crack cocaine.
Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, laudable—or, at
least, understandable—public policy goals do not supersede
112
constitutional protection of individuals’ privacy expectations. And
although historically a finding that a person is “dangerous”
sometimes has been sufficient to warrant her incapacitation even in
the absence of crime, such restraints generally are imposed only after
113
painstaking individualized determinations or when imposed in an
114
extremely targeted fashion.
A further argument against the reasonableness of subjects’
continued expectation of privacy in their DNA profiles is that society
does not “recognize an expectation of privacy in records made for
111. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001) (“[The respondents’] motive was
benign rather than punitive. Such a motive, however, cannot justify a departure from Fourth
Amendment protections . . . .”); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 459
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[C]onsensus that a particular law enforcement technique
serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis.”); Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The record suggests an understandable desire to assert a police
presence [in the drug-ridden neighborhood]; however, that purpose does not negate Fourth
Amendment guarantees.”).
112. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52; see also Jason Tarricone, Note, “An Ordinary Citizen Just Like
Everyone Else”: The Indefinite Retention of Former Offenders’ DNA, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
209, 239 (2005) (noting that by the same logic used to justify indefinite, continuous searches of
genetic profiles without individualized suspicion, “we could probably prevent most rapes (of
women) . . . if we kept all men ages twelve to sixty-five interned in the desert, away from women
and children”).
113. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (holding that nonpunitive civil
commitment imposed after a prison term is constitutional because the applicable statute
requires individualized findings of mental abnormality or personality disorder in addition to
findings of dangerousness); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984) (finding that family-court
judges may predict a juvenile’s future dangerousness based on “a host of variables,” including
the effectiveness of the juvenile’s supervision at home, the juvenile’s situation at school, and
“any special circumstances that might be brought to [the judge’s] attention by the probation
officer, the child’s attorney, or any parents, relatives, or other responsible persons
accompanying the child”); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 27576 (1976) (holding that the
statutory requirement that a prediction of the defendant’s future dangerousness be considered
in the jury’s determination to impose the death penalty is constitutionally permissible because
“the jury ha[s] before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose
fate it must determine”). But see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (explaining that the state
may make “reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail
particular regulatory consequences,” provided, however, that more debilitating constraints are
implemented only upon individualized findings).
114. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) (“Congress’ judgment that a
convicted felon . . . is among the class of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or
possessing firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational.”).
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115

public purposes.” Some courts and commentators refer to this as the
116
true-identity exception to Fourth Amendment protections. The
argument is that “DNA results are like fingerprints which are
maintained on file by law enforcement authorities for use in further
117
investigations.” Because police may reference existing fingerprint
records in the FBI’s national fingerprint database without implicating
the Fourth Amendment, they, the argument goes, should also search
118
the DNA database free of constitutional restraint.
This argument is important because it has the potential to shift
the debate toward either of two exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. If DNA
databases have a record-keeping purpose, then arguably the process
of extracting the samples, profiling them, and compiling the DNA
119
database could be considered either an administrative search or a
120
special-needs search. The question of whether the initial gathering
of DNA samples constitutes an administrative or special-needs search
is beyond the scope of this Note, which instead addresses CODIS
searches occurring after the database has been assembled. Because
these searches indisputably have an investigative purpose, they are
121
ineligible for either exception. The fingerprints-on-file analogy is

115. Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001).
116. Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 430.
117. Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting the trial court)
(internal quotation mark omitted); see also Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[The purpose of the Wisconsin DNA law] is to obtain reliable proof of a felon’s identity.”).
118. See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting petitioner’s claim
that the “Fourth Amendment applies to each ‘search’ of the [DNA] database”). Some courts
even have suggested that subjects should thank their lucky stars for DNA surveillance because
the only difference between fingerprinting and DNA profiling is that DNA is more accurate,
and “the more accurate the identification method the less intrusive it is because of the
associated reduced risk that the sample will result in misidentification.” See United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007). Of course, misidentification is not the privacy concern
that CODIS searches present—rather, one of DNA matching’s real privacy intrusions is its
capacity definitively to identify a CODIS subject as having been present at a noncriminal, but
embarrassing, situation.
119. Administrative searches must have a “subsidiary purpose” distinct from criminal-law
purposes, but neither a concurrent criminal-law purpose nor the discovery of evidence of a
crime in the course of an administrative search strips it of its administrative-exception status.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712, 716 (1987).
120. Special-needs searches’ “primary purpose” is something other than “uncover[ing]
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 4142
(2000). For an examination of whether DNA-collection statutes authorize administrative or
special-needs searches, see generally Maclin, supra note 3.
121. See supra notes 119–120.
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relevant to whether a search of an existing database is a discrete
Fourth Amendment search, however, and so a brief review of the
issue is appropriate.
The principal argument against the DNA-as-fingerprint analogy
mirrors this Note’s first argument against the DNA-as-tangible122
property analogy: there is a gargantuan qualitative difference
between DNA and fingerprints. Fingerprints are capable only of
123
identifying their subjects. In contrast, DNA has the capacity to
identify subjects and to provide deeply personal information about
biological relationships, behavioral predispositions, and disease
124
states. As Professor Elizabeth Joh has written, DNA is different
because “[f]ingerprints do not promise [the] potential for yielding
125
vast amounts of genetic information for government use, forever.”
In this regard, and given the risk of governmental abuse of valuable
personal information and the political vulnerability of the groups
subject to DNA-collection statutes, it is small consolation that DNAdatabasing statutes contain only a few meager safeguards against the
126
government’s misuse of information.
The nature and form of DNA further bolsters one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information contained in her genetic
material, as opposed to on the surface of her fingertips. A person’s
DNA is hidden inside her body’s tissue, encrypted in a code that
127
scientists only comparatively recently began to crack. Indeed, a
person’s genetic identity is so subtly expressed that one cannot know
122. See supra notes 66–68.
123. Joh, supra note 4, at 870.
124. Id. at 870–71.
125. Id. at 871.
126. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (“Power is a heady thing; and
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.”); United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Even governments with
benign intentions have proven unable to regulate or use wisely vast stores of information they
collect regarding their citizens.”); SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 32–33 (1989)
(explaining that “[t]he consequences of testing HIV-positive are even more punitive for those
selected populations—there will be more—upon which the government has already made
testing mandatory” and that these punitive consequences include the removal of personnel who
test HIV-positive from “sensitive” military positions). The most basic safeguard built into the
DNA-databasing process is that a subject’s genetic profile includes only non coding loci. See
supra note 18. The federal DNA-databasing statute and many state statutes also make it a crime
to misuse a biological sample or DNA profile. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2006); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 299.5(i)(1)(a) (West 2008 & Supp. 2012).
127. See International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, supra note 6
(announcing that the Human Genome Project, an international effort to sequence the human
DNA code, was completed in 2003).
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the contents of her own DNA profile without the benefit of scientific
testing. Obviously, then, the embedded, encrypted nature of a
person’s DNA differs dramatically from the familiar swirls that are
visible on that same person’s fingertips.
But perhaps a less obvious comparison is to encrypted
information stored inside a computer. In the context of computers,
courts have found that encryption and password protection create a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information thus encrypted
128
or protected. And although, unlike computer encryption, genetic
coding is biological rather than volitional, that difference does not
affect the expectation of privacy to which the coding gives rise. That
scientists can decode the genome also does not defeat one’s codeinspired expectation of privacy—after all, the government’s computer
scientists likewise can best most computer encryptions and
129
passwords.
IV. ARE CODIS SEARCHES “REASONABLE?” WARRANT AND
INDIVIDUALIZED-SUSPICION REQUIREMENTS
Thus far, this Note has argued that each time law enforcement
officers search a genetic profile in CODIS, they disrupt database
subjects’ subjective, reasonable expectation of privacy in her genetic
information. Therefore, given that the Fourth Amendment is
implicated afresh with each attempt to match a database subject’s
DNA profile with another DNA profile, the next issue to resolve is in
what way the Fourth Amendment should guard subjects’ reasonable
expectations of privacy. The touchstone for this inquiry again is
“reasonableness”; here, however, the Fourth Amendment is
concerned with the reasonableness of the search—as opposed to the
130
reasonableness of the subjects’ privacy expectations.
As has been mentioned, in crafting the standard of
reasonableness that should apply to CODIS search procedures, there

128. Smyth, supra note 79, at 98; see also, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554
(4th Cir. 2007) (finding that password protection places the password-protected files within a
“locked box” for Fourth Amendment purposes (quoting United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535,
539 (4th Cir. 1978))).
129. See The Year in Review, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 29, 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/december/the-year-in-review-part-2/the-year-in-reviewpart-2 (collecting the FBI’s 2011 cyber “takedowns”).
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment . . . [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”).
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is a diverse palette of options from which to choose. In particular,
much scholarly ink has been spilt on the applicability of the special132
needs exception to the warrant and probable-cause requirements. In
these discussions, however, scholars have tended to focus their Fourth
Amendment inquiries on the initial seizure of the tissue sample,
ignoring or rejecting Fourth Amendment harms caused by the
133
profile’s later use.
As a result of this focus, scholars almost entirely have neglected
to consider the similarities between DNA evidence stored in
government databases and computer evidence stored in government
134
copies of hard drives lawfully seized by police. Yet the parallels in
nature, content, and privacy expectations between information stored
in computers and in DNA make application of the rules governing
computer searches an attractive solution to the problem of protecting
the genetic information networked into CODIS’s immense datastorage system. This Part begins by identifying similarities between
DNA and computer evidence. It goes on to outline the increased
protections that courts afford computers, as opposed to DNA, after
government seizure. Next, this Part demonstrates the
unconstitutionality of current CODIS search procedures by way of
analogy to unconstitutional computer searches by general warrant.
Finally, it argues that courts could best vindicate genetic privacy
interests by requiring a modified version of computer-search
procedures for each CODIS search.

131. See supra notes 5460 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at 434 (arguing that arrestee-collection statutes
meet the special-needs test); Maclin, supra note 3, at 118 (arguing that sampling arrestees’ DNA
is not a valid special-needs search); Derek Regensburger, DNA Databases and the Fourth
Amendment: The Time Has Come To Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant
Requirement and the Primary Purpose Test, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 319, 386 (2009) (arguing
that arrestee DNA-collection statutes should be analyzed under the special-needs rubric);
Tarricone, supra note 112, at 248 (arguing that the special-needs exception does not apply to the
retention of “an ex-felon’s DNA sample and profile long after he has completed his sentence”).
133. See supra note 4.
134. For a notable exception, see Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When
DNA Collected for One Purpose Is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289 (2011), which
compares the treatment of government-seized biological samples to the treatment of
government-seized computers, id. at 1312–13. This Note is indebted to Ms. Lowenberg’s
discussion of the similarities between computers and DNA. See id. at 1312 (“[B]oth [computers
and DNA] store a large amount of intermingled information in a small space that cannot be
parsed at the time of collection.”).
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A. Similarities Between DNA and Computer Evidence
DNA and computer evidence share at least three essential
characteristics: both can have a near-dispositive effect on criminal
investigations and prosecutions, both have an enormous storage
capacity relative to their physical size, and both are repositories of
intensely personal information.
First, computer and DNA evidence both are considered so
persuasive that “in many cases” in which the state prevails, they are
135
“the sole proof of guilt that exists.” Computer evidence can be the
principal or only evidence forming the basis of a conviction either
when the defendant is charged with perpetrating a common-law crime
on a computer—fraud is a good example—or when the alleged
136
offense is inherently computer-based. Similarly, the existence of a
genetic-profile match also can be outcome-determinative, as
experience indicates that juries are willing to convict on the strength
137
of DNA evidence alone,
and common sense suggests that
defendants are more likely to plead guilty when DNA evidence can
138
be marshaled against them.
A second shared characteristic is the capacity to store an amount
of information disproportionate to the physical size of the evidentiary
139
medium. Courts concur that “[c]omputers record and store a
remarkable amount of information about what users write, see, hear,

135. See Murphy, supra note 26, at 743 (writing with regard to DNA evidence).
136. See Online Privacy, Social Networking and Crime Victimization: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 5–7 (2010) (statement of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) (discussing types of cybercrime). For example, crimes amenable to proof solely or
principally by computer evidence include child-pornography and intellectual-property offenses.
See id. at 25 (statement of Joe Sullivan, Chief Security Officer, Facebook, Inc.) (discussing the
need for broader information access to better discover evidence of child pornography on socialnetworking websites); id. at 55 (statement of Joe Pasqua, Vice President for Research,
Symantec, Inc.) (discussing the use of social-networking websites to obtain personal information
on key corporate employees in an attempt to gain access to intellectual property).
137. Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough To Convict,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 114043 (2010); see also People v. Rush, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363 (App.
Div. 1998) (affirming a rape conviction when a DNA match implicated the defendant, although
the only other evidence against him were photo and lineup identifications, and although the
victim could not identify the defendant at trial).
138. See Roth, supra note 137, at 1143 n.55 (citing a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea when
the only basis for indictment was DNA evidence). But cf. Murphy, supra note 26, at 742 (noting
that formal statistics on cases relying solely on genetic evidence are hard to come by).
139. Lowenberg, supra note 134, at 1310.
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140

and do.” For example, the average one-hundred gigabyte home
141
computer stores the equivalent of fifty million typed pages, a
142
veritable “library’s worth of information.” Much of this storage
capacity is devoted to personal information such as bills and finance,
medical information (actual medical records, as well as the
computer’s memory of medical websites visited), personal
143
correspondence, and records of other personal activities. DNA
stores a similarly large quantity of information. The DNA in even one
drop of human blood contains all three billion of the human genome’s
144
nucleotide bases, all of which scientists have decoded.
The
substance of this genetic information is extremely personal for
reasons this Note has discussed already: DNA contains the
145
instructions for the proteins that form and regulate our bodies.
Third, and most problematic for Fourth Amendment purposes,
both computers and DNA store information in a highly integrated
manner, intermingling the data in such a way that any one item is
difficult to extract from the system as a whole. In the case of
computers, this means that files for which police have probable cause
and a warrant to search, like records of drug sales, often are
146
interspersed with unrelated personal files, like intimate emails. The
documents that justified the search also may be intermingled with

140. Kerr, supra note 53, at 532; see also, e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888
(9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is true that computers can store a large amount of material . . . .”).
141. Kimberly Nakamaru, Note, Mining for Manny: Electronic Search and Seizure in the
Aftermath of United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 771, 781
(2011).
142. United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001). For the Tenth Circuit, this
impressive capacity places computers beyond “the established categories of constitutional
doctrine” and “[a]nalogies to other physical objects, such as dressers or file cabinets.” Id.
143. See Kerr, supra note 53, at 543 (noting that this information includes, for example, the
user’s actions in frequently used programs, like word processors). Computers also record users’
visits to pornographic websites, a digital foray indulged in by roughly one-fifth of all Internet
users. Anton L. Janik, Jr., Combating the Illicit Internet: Decisions by the Tenth Circuit To Apply
Harsher Sentences and Lessened Search Requirements to Child Pornographers Using Computers,
79 DENV. U. L. REV. 379, 379 (2001).
144. International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, supra note 6.
145. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
146. See Kerr, supra note 53, at 54347 (describing various methods by which a forensic
examiner would seek to locate a particular file from among a computer’s documentary and
programmatic entanglement).
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files evidencing unrelated and previously unsuspected criminal
147
activity.
The kind of information stored in DNA and the manner by
which police access it create similar intermingling problems. In its
descriptive capacity, DNA contains code that dictates tissue and
organ development, but it also contains spans of nucleotide bases that
only regulate (rather than create) bodily systems, as well as spans that
148
appear not to code for anything at all. The trick of DNA profiling,
then, is to separate the purely identifying information from the
genetic-coding information. The DNA-profiling process at least
nominally solves this aspect of the intermingling problem by singling
out and memorializing the nucleotide bases at only the thirteen
specified noncoding loci.
However, a thornier intermingling problem arises with regard to
DNA’s capacity to communicate information about subjects’
biological relationships and presence in physical spaces. The problem
arises because the state first matches each forensic profile against all
the other profiles in the state’s possession and then, if there is no hit,
the FBI matches it against every one of CODIS’s over ten million
149
offender profiles. In neither case does the government make any
effort to limit its search to individuals who law enforcement might
150
reasonably believe to be relevant to the investigation. The result is
that police uncover an enormous amount of information about the
genetic relationships between the source of the forensic sample and
CODIS subjects, as well as information about CODIS subjects’
presence in the place where the forensic profile was found. But even
under the best-case, complete-match scenario, only a tiny fraction of
that information is relevant to the government’s investigation. Thus,
just as computer data-storage systems intermingle information
relevant to a criminal investigation with irrelevant personal
information, so do police procedures for matching DNA profiles
intermingle information relevant to their investigation—that is,

147. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 127071 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
police found child pornography while searching the suspect’s computer for evidence of drug
sales).
148. See The New Genetics: Chapter 1: How Genes Work, NAT’L INST. OF GEN. MED. SCI.,
http://publications.nigms.nih.gov/thenewgenetics/chapter1.html#c1 (last updated June 9, 2011).
149. The FBI and DNA Part 1: A Look at the Nationwide System That Helps Solve Crimes,
supra note 34.
150. Cf. id. (describing how a forensic profile is first compared to “all the offenders from [a]
state’s database,” and then later may be compared to “all the 50 states’ offender profiles”).
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profile matches wherein the CODIS subject is the perpetrator of the
crime—with the irrelevant but personal information communicated
151
by profile misses and by profile matches wherein the CODIS
152
subject is not the perpetrator of the crime.
B. Differences in Current Treatment of Computer and DNA Searches
Despite their similarities in form and content, computer evidence
and genetic profiles generally have received very different treatment
153
under Fourth Amendment law. Specifically, courts’ protection of
privacy interests in information stored on personal computers even
after police lawfully have seized the machines stands in marked
contrast to courts’ denial of privacy interests in DNA profiles after
individuals have been compelled to hand over a tissue sample.
Because the procedures governing the initial seizure of
computers and DNA influence courts’ subsequent treatment of the
evidence, those procedures warrant a quick inspection here.
Computer seizures must be authorized by a warrant and probable
154
cause, per the basic Fourth Amendment standard. Thus, in the
course of a warranted search, police generally may seize computers
155
that they believe contain evidence specified in their warrant. Once a
computer is in the government’s possession, police create a perfect,
read-only copy of the hard drive, including a copy of all the
156
computer’s files, programs, and metadata. The government then
searches its copy of the computer for the evidence enumerated in its
157
search warrant. In so searching, police are permitted to open every
151. For a discussion of privacy interests in information concerning biological relationships,
see supra notes 6974 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of privacy interests in information concerning physical movements, see
supra notes 7578 and accompanying text.
153. Some commentators have challenged this treatment. Noteworthy examples include
Kelly Lowenberg, supra note 134, and Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 113 (2011). Josh Goldfoot is Senior Counsel of the
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Department of Justice and argues that
computer searches should be stripped of their Fourth Amendment protections and, inter alia, be
treated similarly to blood analysis. Goldfoot, supra, at 112 & n *, 113, 150–51.
154. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 3 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/
ssmanual2009.pdf.
155. United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008).
156. Kerr, supra note 53, at 54041.
157. Id. at 540. Thus, like DNA searches, computer searches entail searching information
that the government possesses “non-rivalrous[ly]” with the subject of the search. Id. at 560.
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file on their copy of the computer, regardless of the file’s apparent
158
irrelevance to their investigation, because “computer files can be
disguised in any number of ingenious ways,” and computer “data
159
might be erased,” “hidden,” or even “booby trap[ped].” However,
courts restrict computer search targets to the documents and files
160
specified in the search warrant. As a consequence, searches
intended to uncover evidence of all or different crimes are strictly off161
limits.
This restriction on computer-search targets has several important
implications. First, even when a search warrant is based on a
reasonable belief that a computer-centered crime, like possession of
child pornography, has been committed, the warrant violates the
Fourth Amendment by “provid[ing] the government with
unrestrained access to electronic records of [the suspect’s] daily
162
activities and private affairs” if it does not list the evidence for
163
which the police plan to search the computer. Instead of looking
only for child pornography, courts fear, police “might review expense
reports, income-related files and correspondence, and federal filing
information in search of evidence of tax evasion,” or “[o]fficers might
read through e-mail correspondence in search of evidence of an
164
internet-based phishing scheme.” Courts recognize that evidence of
unsuspected crimes could well be found on the government’s copy of
a suspect’s hard drive—and if the case law is any indication, child
pornography often is found unexpectedly—but courts nonetheless
have determined that a suspect’s privacy interest in expense reports

158. See Manno v. Christie, No. 08-3254, 2008 WL 4058016, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2008)
(noting that because an agent would have been authorized to briefly review all paper documents
to determine their relevance to the warrant, it was similarly reasonable for an agent to open all
computer files in search of relevant information); cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482
n.11 (1976) (“[I]t is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily,
in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.”).
159. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).
160. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 154, at 90–91 (“If
the agent comes across evidence of a crime that is not identified by the warrant, it may be safe
practice to obtain a second warrant.”).
161. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 78283 (7th Cir. 2010).
162. United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2010).
163. Id. at 62.
164. Id. at 61.
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and emails outweighs the social value of prosecuting other
165
discovered, but previously unsuspected, crimes.
Second, courts’ belief that warrants provide essential protection
for digital information has influenced their development of additional
procedural requirements for computer searches. For example, one
court has eliminated the plain-view exception to the warrant
166
requirement in the computer search context. Additionally, some
courts require government agents searching a computer to obtain a
second warrant when, in the course of their original warranted search,
167
they inadvertently come across evidence of a second crime. Indeed,
to “abandon” the first search to pursue evidence of the second crime
is to violate the Fourth Amendment, and if the state falls prey to this
temptation, it loses the right to use the evidence of the second crime
168
in criminal proceedings.

165. See, e.g., United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470, 474–75 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting evidence
of child pornography found by police in the course of a computer search for evidence of an
illegal gambling operation); United States v. Highbarger, 380 Fed. App’x 127, 128 (3d Cir. 2010)
(rejecting evidence of child pornography that police discovered while searching a computer for
evidence of illegal drug dealing); Mann, 592 F.3d at 780–81, 786 (stating that a detective found
child pornography while searching the defendant’s computer for evidence of an unrelated crime
and noting that “[a]lthough we now hold that [the detective’s] actions were within the scope of
the warrant, we emphasize that his failure to stop his search and request a separate warrant for
child pornography is troubling”); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999)
(suppressing evidence of child pornography because the officer’s computer search exceeded the
scope of the warrant).
166. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (repudiating the plain-view doctrine because it turns “all
warrants for digital data into general warrants”).
167. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276; see also United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir.
2005) (stating that officers should hold irrelevant computer files until the new conditions and
limitations of the search are established); People v. Carratu, 755 N.Y.S.2d 800, 80709 (Sup. Ct.
2003) (relying on United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999), to suppress images of
false-identification documents discovered under a warrant for evidence related to another
crime). U.S. Department of Justice guidelines note that it is good practice for agents to obtain a
second warrant when they encounter evidence of a crime in plain view while conducting a
computer search for evidence of a different crime. Lily R. Robinton, Courting Chaos:
Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the Need for Clearer Rules To Govern the Search
and Seizure of Digital Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 311, 340 n.148 (2010); COMPUTER
CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 154, at 90.
168. Compare Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276 (finding a Fourth Amendment violation when a
police officer abandoned his computer search for drug-related evidence to search for child
pornography after coming across an image of child pornography in his original warranted
search), with United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 109295 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding no
Fourth Amendment violation when an officer obtained a second warrant after encountering one
image of child pornography during his search of a computer for evidence of illegal drug
activity).
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In contrast to this type of individualized determination, DNA
169
samples are seized from all members of statutorily defined groups,
regardless of the applicability of DNA evidence to the case that
170
brought the subject within the collection statute’s purview. Thus,
when a person meets the statutory requirements—for example, by
being convicted of using a revoked credit card—the state seizes her
DNA as a matter of course, without suspicion that the person is
involved in any unresolved crime, and regardless of the fact that her
conviction obviates any use for her DNA in connection with the
171
crime with which she was charged. So, although a suspect in a
specific and unresolved crime maintains a privacy interest in the
contents of a government-owned copy of her personal computer,
lawful state seizure of a convict’s biological sample terminates her
Fourth Amendment rights with regard to the genetic profile
generated from that sample. Once the DNA is in the state’s hands,
the police are free to examine its genetics, keep it in their database
forever, and match it against any and all forensic DNA profiles, all
172
without judicial authorization.
What accounts for this difference? Part of the explanation may
be that invasion of electronic privacy is a specter that judges fear
169. See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.
170. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 1331 (noting that no mandatory collection statute
“requires any findings of particularized need for collection—the onetime felonious bad-check
writer convicted forty years ago must provide a sample alongside the incorrigible rapist”).
171. See ALA. CODE § 36-18-24(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (mandating collection of a
DNA sample from all convicted felons); id. § 13A-9-14(b)(2), (e) (LexisNexis 2005) (designating
the use of a revoked credit card as a felony).
172. See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (analogizing properly collected
DNA to a fingerprint and noting that “the Fourth Amendment does not control how properly
collected information is deployed”); State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003) (holding that
once DNA is procured lawfully from a defendant, no privacy interest persists). But see Boroian
v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2010) (“We do not hold . . . that once a DNA sample is
lawfully extracted . . . , the individual necessarily loses a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to any subsequent use of that profile.”). Perversely, some courts find that categorical
seizure in the absence of individualized suspicion bolsters the reasonableness of the seizures. See
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the DNA-collection statute
meets the special-needs test precisely because the DNA is collected apart from any
investigation, and thus cannot further ordinary law enforcement purposes); Shelton v.
Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (“The standardized nature of the DNA
collection process gives minimal discretion to the persons administering it . . . .”). But cf.
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 53031 (1967) (“It is surely anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has
a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may
be broken by official authority . . . .”).
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more than they fear DNA surveillance. Whereas judges have firsthand knowledge of their own embarrassing computer habits and
electronically stored information, they likely have only a fuzzy
understanding of comparably basic facts about their genomes. But
additionally, the classes of people subject to DNA-collection statutes
are distinctly “other” than most judges and lawmakers. DNA statutes
often apply only to our justice system’s collection of felons, violent
173
offenders, and sex offenders, groups who are disproportionately
174
African-American and poor. In contrast, suspects in computer
crimes tend to be older, whiter, and wealthier than other categories of
175
criminals.
Another key distinction is the differing conceptual frameworks
into which courts have fitted computers and DNA. On the one hand,
a majority of courts understand a computer hard drive to be
something akin to “a container that stores thousands of individual
[sub]containers in the form of discrete files,” each one of which is
176
entitled to constitutional protection. On the other hand, courts
conceptually freeze DNA in its physical form, making it and its
associated profile a unitary “item of tangible property, such as a
177
178
gun” that after seizure only “is examined, not ‘searched.’” The
decision to view computers as containers of file-sized units of

173. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(B), (d) (2006) (requiring the director of the Bureau
of Prisons to collect DNA from incarcerated felons, sex offenders, violent offenders, and
offenders convicted of attempt or conspiracy to commit a felony, sex crime, or crime of
violence).
174. Steven Raphael, The Socioeconomic Status of Black Males: The Increasing Importance
of Incarceration, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION 319, 319 (Alan J.
Auerbach, David Card & John M. Quigley eds., 2006); see also Kaye & Smith, supra note 4, at
452 (“[N]early 30% of black males, but less than 5% of white males . . . [are] imprisoned on a
felony conviction at some point in their lives.”).
175. See Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 16162 (writing specifically with regard to childpornography offenders). People arrested for such computer-intensive crimes as embezzlement
and fraud also are largely white. See Crime in the United States, Table 43: Arrests by Race, 2010,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/table-43 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (illustrating that in
2010, 66 percent of those convicted of fraud and 66.3 percent of those convicted of
embezzlement were white).
176. Kerr, supra note 53, at 555; see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980)
(“Ever since 1878 . . . it has been settled that an officer’s authority to possess a package is
distinct from his authority to examine its contents.”). But see United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d
449, 46465 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that one’s privacy interests in her computer are
compromised fatally when police view any of the computer’s contents).
177. People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div. 1997).
178. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 113.
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information, however, is a construction not mandated by the nature
of the computer device. A computer just as tenably could be divided
179
into units of folders rather than files, or could be seen as a physical
object that “does not contain things,” but rather “is one thing:” one
180
hard drive, which, once seized, may be examined freely. Likewise, it
also is possible to view DNA profiles as more informational than
physical, and in terms of the relationships and presences they disclose,
rather than the physical samples from which they are derived.
C. Unreasonableness of the Current CODIS Search Paradigm
Denying application of Fourth Amendment protections to
CODIS searches by classifying DNA as a single, lawfully seized
object misses the point of exactly how DNA-database searches
violate reasonable privacy expectations. The greatest portion of the
privacy invasion engendered by DNA surveillance comes not from
the physical seizure and profiling of the sample, but from the
repeated suspicionless CODIS searches that occur after the profile
181
has been created. Therefore, to the extent that the physical DNA
specimen is extracted by standard medical procedures and is profiled
according to thirteen noncoding loci, current search procedures are
indeed “reasonable” in relation to the invasions involved in that
182
initial search. The real invasion of privacy arises when the subject’s
genetic profile is compared to other genetic profiles one-hundred
183
thousand times a day, for the rest of the subject’s life. These
179. See United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 94950 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (conceptualizing
a computer’s component units in terms of folders).
180. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 113.
181. See supra Part III.B.
182. See, e.g., Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he privacy
invasion caused by a blood test is relatively small . . . . In Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966)], the Court upheld the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from a motorist
suspected of driving while intoxicated, despite his refusal to consent to the intrusion. The Court
noted that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is minimal because such ‘tests are a
commonplace . . . and . . . for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain.’” (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771)). This assumes the existence of adequate
protections against government abuse of the sample and the profile, which is a contested
proposition. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
183. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 1390–91 (suggesting that the impairment of negative
liberty inheres in surveillance as exemplified by the psychological effect of knowing that one’s
biometric profile is accessed repeatedly every day); cf. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 451–53 (1990) (clarifying that the Court’s holding that the sobriety checkpoint satisfied
the special-needs test was limited to “the initial stop” and that “[d]etention of particular
motorists for [a] more extensive” period “may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion
standard”).
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searches trample upon reasonable privacy expectations by tracking
subjects’ biological relationships and physical whereabouts forever,
divorced from any degree of suspicion that the subject engaged in any
of the criminal activities in connection to which her profile is
searched. It is in relation to these searches that current search
procedures are wholly unreasonable.
Formally, CODIS searches are presumptively unreasonable
184
because they are searches conducted in the absence of a warrant.
However, as Professor Eve Primus has written, “[f]or some
time, . . . experts have understood that warrantless searches are in
practice common” and that “[a]s long as the government is
reasonably pursuing a legitimate government interest, the warrant
185
and probable cause requirements regularly fade away.” For this
reason, CODIS searches’ similarities to constitutionally impermissible
computer searches by general warrant are particularly helpful in
highlighting the unreasonableness of the CODIS search paradigm.
CODIS searches are, in essence, general-warrant computer
searches turned on their head: instead of searching a single computer
for evidence of any and every crime, DNA matching searches any and
every CODIS subject for evidence of one particular crime (times one
186
hundred thousand, every day). So, inasmuch as a computer search
187
for evidence of any crime is an impermissible exploratory search,
and inasmuch as courts refuse the government’s request to “take [all
of a suspect’s computer equipment] back to the lab, have a good look
188
around and see what we might stumble upon,” courts also should

184. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
185. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254,
255 (2011); see also supra notes 5860 and accompanying text.
186. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1391.
187. United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2010).
188. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam). This case is a wonderful example of courts’ comparatively favorable privacy treatment
of electronic evidence because its facts evoke medical-privacy concerns but also involve
electronic recordkeeping. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that federal agents violated the
Fourth Amendment when they seized and examined hundreds of baseball players’ steroid
blood-test results because the agents had probable cause to examine only ten players’ records.
Id. at 1170–72. The same court that upheld a suspicionless DNA-seizure statute, United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 835 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), then ordered the government to return the
unsuspected players’ test results in order to restore their privacy interests, which had been
intolerably impaired by the seizure, Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1173. The
outcome offers a particularly interesting parallel to issues of DNA-database searches, given that
one might imagine that professional baseball players as a class are more likely than the general
population to engage in illegal steroid use, just as once-incarcerated criminals as a class are
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question a protocol that allows government agents to engage in
fishing expeditions to connect DNA-database subjects with all and
sundry crimes, none of which they actually suspect any of the subjects
189
of committing.
D. Modifying Computer-Search Procedures for Application to DNADatabase Searches
By virtue of their continuing respect for owners’ privacy
following computer seizures, courts’ treatment of computer searches
offers an attractive solution to DNA-database searches’ problematic
intermingling of relevant and irrelevant personal information.
Moreover, computer and DNA-database searches threaten the same
type of governmental abuse, making the same type of procedural
protections appropriate. With computer searches, the danger is that
police will go after a suspect for every crime for which they can find a
scrap of evidence on the computer, regardless of the contours of their
190
original suspicion. DNA-database searches amount to the same
thing because CODIS searches are most realistically seen not as oneoff searches for the perpetrator of a single crime, but as a continuous
stream of searches in which investigators hound CODIS subjects for
every crime for which they have one scrap of evidence (a DNA
sample) to compare.
However, to account for the different logistical issues that arise
in computer and DNA searches, some modifications should be made
to the computer-search model before it is applied to genetic-profile
searches. Specifically, courts should continue to allow initial
suspicionless seizures of biological samples but should require a
warrant and probable cause for later searches of the DNA profiles
more likely than the general population to commit a future offense. See Mitchell Report:
Baseball Slow To React to Players’ Steroid Use, ESPN.COM (Dec. 14, 2007, 11:29 AM ET),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153509 (“Doping was widespread by stars as well
as scrubs, the report said . . . .”); Eric Holder, Second Chances and Safer Communities, JUSTICE
BLOG (May 24, 2012), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/2212 (“[R]oughly 40 percent of
those released return to prison or jail within three years.”).
189. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 57172 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result) (explaining “that ‘exploratory searches . . . cannot be undertaken by officers with or
without a warrant’” is a “basic constitutional rule” (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 62 (1950))); cf. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (“[I]n a criminal
investigation, the police may undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that
public interest could hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that
these goods might be found.”).
190. Or, in Professor Murphy’s formulation, the danger of the “overzealous, overstepping
constable.” Murphy, supra note 4, at 830.
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generated from those samples, and the biological samples themselves
should be destroyed after the profiles are created.
Suspicionless seizures and profiling should be allowed to
continue because the seizures themselves invade privacy interests
only minimally and because the government’s ability to store profiles
of DNA taken from members of rationally drawn, statutorily
prescribed groups is a valuable law enforcement tool. As many have
argued, subjects suffer little as a direct result of biological-sample
seizures because DNA-extraction procedures are relatively
191
noninvasive, and because the profile by itself (as opposed to in
192
comparison with other profiles) is basically innocuous. Additionally,
suspicionless seizures and profiling allow the government to keep
subjects’ identifying information on file and ready for use if a subject
later becomes a suspect in an investigation. Thus, under such a
system, the profiles actually would serve the true-identity function
that proponents tout, and the profiles would be available for law
enforcement use regardless of the later unavailability of the subject
193
herself. However, to protect subjects’ privacy interests in their
genetic material and definitively solve one facet of the informationintermingling problem that DNA presents, courts should order the
194
biological samples to be destroyed after the profile is created.
Then, as with post-seizure computer searches, courts should
require the government to obtain a search warrant—based on
probable cause to believe that the DNA profile to be searched will
produce evidence of the crime under investigation—before the
195
government is allowed to search a DNA profile that it created.
Requiring a warrant and probable cause would resolve the other facet

191. See Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he swabbing of saliva to
obtain a DNA sample is even less invasive than the drawing of a blood sample.”); cf. Johnson v.
Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Supreme Court precedent approving
compelled blood-alcohol tests as a relatively small privacy invasion).
192. See Etzioni, supra note 95, at 217 (“[P]roponents of DNA databases argue that [genetic
profiles] do not provide any meaningful information about individuals aside from allowing
[analysts] to determine whether two samples come from the same person.”).
193. See supra notes 115118 and accompanying text.
194. In Wisconsin, the current policy is to destroy subjects’ biological samples after profiles
are created. Suter, supra note 5, at 334 & n.172. That is likewise the policy in several European
countries that maintain DNA databases. SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC
JUSTICE: DNA DATABANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 182 (2011).
195. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman . . . .”).
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of the information-intermingling problem by narrowing the returns
on DNA searches to information likely to be relevant to the
investigation, thereby minimizing needless privacy invasion and
196
justifying what invasion does occur. Additionally, requiring a
judge’s determination of probable cause before each search would
reaffirm constitutional values by “interpos[ing] a magistrate between
the citizen and the police,” instead of leaving CODIS subjects
vulnerable to zealous officers’ determinations of when searching their
197
genetic code is reasonable.
Ironically, in some respects, computer-search procedures even
promise a more effective vindication of Fourth Amendment
principles in the context of DNA evidence than they currently furnish
to computer searches. For instance, commentators such as Josh
Goldfoot have criticized as formalistic the requirement that, in
conducting a computer search, police must obtain a second warrant in
order to pursue evidence of a crime that they discover in the process
of their initial warranted search: “Formally, [the second warrant]
authorizes the officer to search for new things on the same hard drive.
Practically, it simply lets the officer examine evidence that he already
198
has, so that he can read what he has already read.” The quandary
arises because in searching a computer, officers must open every file,
199
as computers can be configured to misdirect or deceive. Thus, the
multiple-warrant requirement provides only formal privacy
protections to subjects of computer searches because it does not
actually save their personal files from investigators’ prying eyes.
Rather, its only real consequence is to disallow the state’s use of
computer evidence of the extrawarranted crime at trial if the
investigator failed to obtain a second warrant before searching for the
200
extrawarranted evidence.
Genetic-profile searches are not subject to the same practical
constraints. Instead of storing information in scattered and misleading
196. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (“[A]ny intrusion in the way of
search or seizure is an evil, so . . . no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior
determination of necessity.” (emphasis omitted)).
197. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
198. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 144.
199. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 88990 (1st Cir. 2008).
200. Goldfoot, supra note 153, at 14445; see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“The problem can be stated very
simply: There is no way to be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without somehow
examining its contents . . . .”).
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locations, DNA-profile information is tucked tidily away in the
government’s database, making it easy for police to isolate and search
some profiles without disturbing others. As a result, requiring a
warrant to search specified profiles in the government’s possession
would be an extremely effective means of limiting the government’s
needless exposure of unsuspected subjects’ private information, but it
would not compromise the effectiveness of the government’s search
of the relevant subjects’ profiles.
CONCLUSION
Thus far, judges have sanctioned legislatures’ creation of a
multistep DNA-database search process whereby the reasonableness
and minimal invasiveness of the first step are permitted to shield later
steps’ intrusions from constitutional scrutiny. The extraction of blood
and the generation of a genetic profile from noncoding sites on the
genome may intrude only slightly upon a subject’s privacy interests.
However, considered in those terms, the government’s interest in
possessing the blood and profile also is slight. The value of the genetic
profile, both to police and to the subject’s privacy, exists only when
the genetic profile is compared with other profiles because only then
can the profile disclose information about biological relationships and
physical movements. Therefore, to address the real governmental and
privacy interests at stake, the Fourth Amendment discussion of
DNA-collection statutes should begin at the point of comparison—
not at the point of extraction. This Note has attempted to do just that
and has argued that because DNA-database subjects have an actual
and reasonable expectation of privacy in their genetic profiles even
after their biological samples are in government hands, DNAdatabase searches are “searches” under the Fourth Amendment.
This Note also has argued that DNA-database searches are
unreasonable as they are currently conducted because they lack
individualized suspicion and warrant authorization and because they
so closely resemble general-warrant computer searches. It has further
argued that computer-search procedures suggest a constitutionally
preferable alternative because those procedures were developed to
guard against the same kind of danger posed by unrestrained DNAdatabase searches and because they recognize continuing reasonable
expectations of privacy following a government seizure. The only
question that remains, then, is a normative one: as a society, do we
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really believe that a computer is more deserving of privacy
protections than our DNA?

